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VALUE: A CASE STUDY 
 
Experimental economics is a research tool, where information collected in conducted experiments is used to 
verify the validity of economic theories, estimate the size of the studied effect or highlight the market mechanism. 
Economic experiments usually use money (virtual or real) to motivate participants to imitate the real incentives that 
occur in real markets. Experiments are used to understand how and why markets and other exchange systems 
operate in this way. The purpose of this chapter is to use the achievements of experimental economics to assess 
social added value that arises in the course of the production and delivery of public goods and to verify the 
effectiveness of public policy instruments that can stimulate such social added value. The article consists of (1) 
conceptual and methodological part, in which the details of the experiment were presented, (2) description of the 
research sample and (3) analysis of the results of the experiment together with developed conclusions and 
indications for further research on this issue. The conclusions of this article can be used in business practice in the 
process of programming by public authorities of instruments supporting specific public policies. 
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Introduction 
The use of experiments to study theories and 
economic regularities with the participation of groups of 
students dates back to Chamberlin (1948), who carried 
out an study showing that prices do not always reach 
market equilibrium. His work was continued, among 
others, by Vernon Smith (1962), the Nobel Memorial 
Prize in Economic Sciences in 2002, who conducted 
pioneering economic experiments on the convergence of 
prices and quantities with their theoretical values in a 
state of competitive equilibrium (Smith 1991). In our 
work, we attempt to apply the achievements of 
experimental economics to evaluate social added value 
created by groups during the production and delivery of 
public goods, as well as to verify the effectiveness of 
potential public policy instruments that could stimulate 
such value. Our research findings can only offer certain 
suggestions in the process of shaping legal and 
organizational solutions stimulating the creation of the 
common good due to the limitations that apply to 
economic experiments in regard of the difficulties in 
associating results of games with preferences and 
beliefs guiding decision-making in daily life (Smith 
2005). 
Research concept and methodology 
Principles of experiment 
From the methodological point of view, the 
analysis is based on a pre-experimental research plan 
(Thyer 2012) and its aim was to verify the possibilities 
of measuring preferences in terms of creating social 
added value through experiments involving the 
maximisation of individual profits. The experiment was 
carried out in 10 rounds of simulated undertakings, in 
which social added value was created. In each round, 
the participants were given 20 PLN each and were 
expected to decide how much of their allotted money to 
spend on creating a social good, and how much to keep 
in their private pockets.’ Each round was played out 
according under different conditions in order to assess 
the level of social added value generated depending on 
the public policy instrument used. Each round was 
independent of the others and at the beginning, the 
participants were given PLN 20 each, no matter what 
they had decided to do with it previously. 
Social goods were created with contributions from 
individual participants, who were additionally divided 
into 4 cities. Each city constituted a separate society and 
consisted of 4 so-called ‘households,’ which produced a 
social good to meet their own needs. It was assumed 
that the production of a social good would contribute 
first, to increasing the welfare of all the residents of a 
given city (e.g. a well-educated person would contribute 
to increasing societal welfare), and second, the 
improvement resulting from the provision of a given 
social good would be the same for all the residents. For 
this reason, the funds collected for the social good 
increased in value in each round by 60%, and then were 
split equally among the residents of a given city. The 
mechanism of creating a social good is illustrated in 
Figure 1 below. 
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Fig. 1. General principles governing the creation of a public good in each round 
 
Source: own study. 
One of the key experiment design points involved 
its division into two parts. In Part One, the participants 
did not know the other residents in their city, hence they 
did not have the opportunity to communicate with one 
another and had to create social goods in anonymous 
micro-societies. In Part Two, the composition of the 
cities was disclosed and participants were given the 
opportunity to agree on and pursue joint strategies. 
Moreover, they were placed in the room in such a way 
as to create spatially coherent communities. Each round 
was independent of the others, i.e. the decisions made in 
each round and their results did not affect the 
subsequent rounds. 
The individual goal of each participant was to 
maximise their personal pay-out function. Each 
participant was set the task of achieving the highest 
possible value of their assets within 10 rounds. The 
outcomes were then compared not only with those 
obtained by the other residents of their city, but also 
with those held by all the other participants in the 
experiment. The person whose assets turned out to be 
the most valuable was offered a reward(half a point 
towards his/her course completion grade, which the 
students found to be quite attractive) on the one hand, 
intended to motivate the participants to compete with 
one another and to make rational decisions, and on the 
other, meant to prevent the participants from adopting 
strategies maximising group benefits at the expense of 
individual ones.  
Each round introduced different quasi-public 
policy instruments aimed to motivate the participants to 
allocate as much of their resources as possible to the 
creation a social good. Subsequent rounds of the game 
are described in detail in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 
Mechanisms intended to motivate experiment participants to create social added value 
Round Round protocol Motivational mechanisms 
1 Each participant may contribute any amount from PLN 0 to 20. No motivational mechanisms 
2 Each participant decides how much they wish to spend on a 
public good (PLN 0–20), with the obligatory minimum 
contribution set at PLN 6. Any smaller contribution is treated as 
PLN 6. 
Mandatory minimum 
contribution to create a public 
good 
3 Each participant may contribute any amount from PLN 0 to 20, 
but the contribution of one person from each city will be 
checked at random, and if it turns out that s/he has contributed 
less than 6 PLN, s/he must pay quadruple the amount short-paid 
(i.e. 4 x [6 PLN ‒ actual contribution]). The amount of penalty 
will be given to the person who contributed the most in a given 
city. If there are several such persons, the amount will be 
divided equally among them. 
 
Penalty for contributing less 





to the public good 
Profit on the public 
good 
Funds available at 
the end of the 
round 
1,6 x all the 
contributions 
in a city 
Equal division of 
profits 
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Table 1 continuation 
4 Each participant may contribute any amount from PLN 0 to 20, 
but a randomly selected person from each city will have their 
personal pay-out increased by the value of their own contribution 
(i.e. they will be refunded their original contribution). 
A randomly selected participant 
is rewarded  
5 Each participant may contribute any amount from PLN 0 to 20 
under the following conditions:  
‒ the social good is a hospital, which will be built if at least 30 
PLN is collected from contributions in the city; 
‒ if the hospital is not built, one participant is randomly chosen 
and his/her pay-out is reduced to zero (as if this participant ‘died’ 
‒ the hospital was not built, the participant fell ill and no facility 
was available for treatment). 
A randomly selected participant 
is penalised for society’s failure 
to create a social good 
 
6 Each participant may contribute any amount from PLN 0 to 20 as 
per individual decision. 
Potential to create social capital 
7 The contribution fixed by the city is a minimum, with the 
provision that 2 participants are to be randomly checked and if 
they are found to have contributed less than the minimum, they 
pay double the amount short-paid to the participant who has 
contributed the most. 
Potential to create social 
capital; randomly selected 
participants penalised for 
giving less than the minimum 
contribution 
8 Each participant may contribute any amount from PLN 0 to 20, 
but a randomly selected participant in each city will have their 
personal pay-out increased by the value of their own contribution 
(i.e. they will be refunded their original contribution). 
Potential to create social 
capital, potential reward for the 
largest amount contributed 
9 As in Part One, the social good is a hospital, which will be built if 
at least 30 PLN is collected from contributions in the city. 
If the total contributions fail to reach this amount, a person is 
selected at random to have their pay-out reduced to zero. 
Potential for creating social 
capital, a randomly selected 
participant is penalised for 
society’s failure to create a 
public good 
10 The group sets a minimum contribution. Everyone can denounce 
a single resident of their city who in their view has contributed 
less. Submitting one denunciation carries a fee of PLN 2; if it 
turns out to be true, the participant who submitted it will receive 
PLN 10 from the perpetrator. Moreover, the perpetrator forfeits 
double the amount short-paid (i.e. nobody gets it). 
If the denunciation is untrue, the accuser loses PLN 8 (on top of 
the denunciation fee). 
Potential to create social 
capital, social control 
Source: own study. 
 
Definition of social added value in the experiment 
In this experiment, in order to operationalise social 
added value, it was assumed that the social added value 
generated in each of the rounds is relative in nature and 
can be calculated in two ways: 
1. as the difference between the arithmetic mean of 
the contributions transferred to the public good in a given 
round and the arithmetic mean of the contributions 
transferred in round 1, 
2. as the difference between the median of the 
contributions transferred to the public good in a given 
round and the median of the contributions transferred in 
round 1. 
Thus, in each of the two cases, the reference point 
for determining social added value was the total amount 
of contributions transferred in Round 1. 
The background to the experiment was the so-called 
tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 2015). 
According to this concept, if a large number of users 
takes advantage of common resources, the latter become 
depleted. In this experiment, this trend is counterbalanced 
by certain public policy instruments intended to limit the 
participants’ desire to maximise their individual profits at 
the expense of group benefit (social added value). 
Research sample 
The experiment was carried out in 2012‒2017 with 
three groups of participants consisting of students from 
different specialties at Cracow University of Economics: 
Economy and Public Administration (GAP), 
Administration, and Economics. 
In most cases, the dean’s group comprised 16 
individuals, but quite often
1
 the experiment was 
conducted with larger groups. The participants were then 
divided into 16 households (2, 3 and sometimes 4-person 
ones) and decisions to contribute a certain amount of 
money to the social good were made in groups. However, 
                                                          
1
 An estimated 70-80% of households. 
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a certain proportion of participants in the experiment
2
 
were individuals who made their own decisions. In the 
case of a smaller groups, only 3 cities were created, 
inhabited by 4 residents or all 4 cities were created, each 
with 3 residents. However, there were very few such 
situations. 
The first research group consisted of third-year 
GAP students. The group was highly homogenous, with 
the vast majority being 21‒22 year old full-time students. 
Research in this group was conducted in 2012‒2017 and 
included observations of the behaviours of a total of 304 
individuals participating in the experiment. 
The second research group consisted of third-year 
Administration students. This group was slightly less 
homogeneous than the first one and consisted of full-time 
students aged 21‒22, and part-time students, where the 
standard deviation in the age was much higher. 
Moreover, part-time students often work full-time, and 
thereby spend less time studying, which was reflected in 
the decisions made during the experiment. Research in 
this group was conducted in 2012‒2017 and included 
observations of the behaviours of a total of 400 
individuals participating in the experiment. 
The last, third research group comprised students of 
Economics, and predominantly consisted of full-time 
students. The research covered a total of 431 observations 
conducted in 2014‒2017. 
The experiment, its findings and analysis 
Round 1 
Round 1 first of all constituted the point of reference 
for calculating the social added value generated in the 
subsequent rounds. No extra public policy instruments 
were applied to influence the contributions. The 
participants had the first opportunity to watch the 
behaviour of their anonymous ‘neighbours’ with whom 
they jointly created the social good. 
Administration students started off with the highest 
point of reference (i.e. mean PLN 8.7, median PLN 9) 
and the lowest standard deviation of contribution value of 
all three groups. A downward trend was observed in the 
average and mean contributions in 2012‒2017, 
accompanied by a simultaneous increase in standard 
deviation. 
Round 2 
In Round 2, the mechanism of a mandatory 
minimum contribution of PLN 6 was applied. It triggered 
very homogeneous behaviours in all three groups 
surveyed ‒the same median values was observed, and the 
arithmetic mean was between PLN 9.2 and PLN 9.4, with 
a much lower standard deviation than in the previous 
round. The analysis of contributions made in 2012‒2017 
reveals, just as in Round 1, a steady decrease in the 
                                                          
2
 An estimated 20-30% of households 
average contributions in the 6 years studied and an 
increasing standard deviation. 
Round 3 
The next round was, among other things, intended 
to investigate the participants’ propensity to take risks. 
The highest tendency was observed amongst the students 
of Economics. 5.6% of Economics students contributed 
PLN 0 in this round, while for the GAP and 
Administration students, the proportions were 3.9% and 
2.8%, respectively. The instrument in question slightly 
increased the value of the average contribution made by 
GAP and Administration students, but reduced it for the 
students of Economics, who proved to be the most 
willing to take risks. The analysis of contributions made 
in 2012‒2017 again shows a decreasing trend, both in 
terms of the arithmetic mean and the median. 
Round 4 
Interesting results were obtained in Round 4, where 
the participants’ reaction to a potential reward was 
assessed. This mechanism, just as the compulsory 
minimum contribution set in Round 2, led to a significant 
unification of the results for all three groups of 
participants, but more importantly, it resulted in an 
increase in the average and mean contributions when 
compared with the previous rounds. The analysis for 
2012‒2017 shows a slight downward trend in the value of 
contributions and a small difference between the median 
and the arithmetic mean. 
Round 5 
Round 5 saw a specific example of social good, 
namely a hospital built with the funds contributed by the 
participants in the experiment. Interestingly, the 
contribution to be allocated to the social good in the area 
of health care there decreased. This can be explained 
firstly, by the fairly young age of the participants and 
hence perhaps a somewhat limited awareness of health 
care issues, and secondly, by their low opinion about 
Poland’s health care system. The analysis for 2012‒2017 
shows a fairly significant downward trend. 
Round 6 
In Round 6, the composition of individual cities was 
revealed. From then on, the participants in the experiment 
had the opportunity to jointly set their strategies. The 
potential to build social capital, which could constitute a 
catalyst for the creation of social added value, was 
released. Contributions in this round increased 
significantly. Remarkably, the increase was higher in the 
first and third research groups, even though it was in 
these groups that the contributions in Rounds 1‒5 were 
usually lower than in the second group. Furthermore, the 
analysis of 2012‒2017 results reveals an upward trend in 
the average contributions, with the median in 2013‒2017 
reaching its maximum value. For that reason, it can be 
concluded that a lower than average level of social capital 
in anonymous research groups and, as a consequence, 
low social added value, resulted in a greater dynamics of 
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change immediately after the abolition of group 
anonymity. 
Round 7 
In Round 7, the minimum contribution mechanism 
(this time independently set by each city) and the 
potential penalty for non-compliance was reintroduced. In 
the course of the experiment, the participants contributed 
slightly less money to the social good than in Round 6. 
The reason was that the participants were tempted to 
maximise the value of their private funds. The results 
varied by research group. The lowest contributions were 
made by Administration students, whereas the highest 
were offered by Economics students. At this point, it is 
worth noting that in Part One of the experiment, 
Administration students usually made the highest 
contributions to the social good, while Economics 
students contributed the least. In Part Two of the 
experiment, the situation was completely reversed, and it 
was Economics students who made the highest average 
contributions. For 2012‒2017, the downward trend of the 
arithmetic mean was small, but the median was 
characterised by a relatively high fluctuation. 
Round 8 
Round 8 was intended to verify the effectiveness of 
the prize mechanism, but this time, not in an anonymous 
society. The findings show that the perspective of a 
reward did not increase the average contribution to the 
social good. Individual factors, such as interpersonal 
relations among the city residents, its territorial layout or 
the presence of a strong personality in the city may have 
exerted a greater influence on the behaviour of the 
participants. In the successive rounds of the experiment in 
Part Two, the average contributions in the all the research 
groups became more consistent. The analysis of 2012‒
2017 shows a slight decreasing tendency of the arithmetic 
mean and, as in the previous round, a fairly high 
fluctuation of the median.  
Round 9 
The penultimate round again involved a specific 
example of a social good, again a hospital built with the 
funds contributed by the participants in the experiment. In 
the case of two research groups (GAP and Administration 
students), the differences in the average contributions 
made as compared with Round 8 were very small. On the 
other hand, the median in these groups increased. In the 
case of the third research group, the arithmetic mean of 
the contributions clearly decreased and a slight decrease 
in the median was noted. The analysis for 2012‒2017 
shows a fairly clear decreasing tendency of the arithmetic 
mean and nearly the maximum value of the median.  
Round 10 
In the last round of the experiment, denunciation 
was introduced as a mechanism intended to motivate the 
participants to make more substantial contributions to 
the creation of a social good. It was only possible to 
denounce another participant-resident of one’s own city. 
Denouncements were possible once the tallies of returns 
on investments in the social good were revealed, which 
limited the number of denouncements if it was known 
that all the participants contributed the maximum 
amount of PLN 20. This mechanism was not used very 
often, and then mainly by those participants who 
cooperated in their group (city) with people who chose 
to maximise their private funds so far. 
Average contributions to the creation of a social 
good in Round 10 amounted to c.a. 15 PLN and were 
similar to those in Rounds 8 and 9. This implies a 
certain degree of stabilisation of the participants’ 
behaviour in Part Two of the experiment. 
When observing the behaviour of all the 
participants in the experiment in successive rounds, the 
following were noted: 
‒In Part One: Round 4 (the presence of a reward 
mechanism) was characterised by the highest average 
contributions made to the creation of a social good, and 
in Round 2 (minimum contribution),standard deviation 
reached the lowest value;  
- In Part Two: Round 6 (disclosure of city 
composition) was characterised by the highest average 
contributions, whereas the average values in the 
following rounds took a sinusoidal course; 
- In Part One, the average contribution was about 
PLN 9, in Part Two the average contribution was about 
15 PLN (increase by 60.8%), with the median reaching 
the maximum value of PLN 20, which means that the 
majority of participants in Part Two made the maximal 
contribution from their private funds to the creation of a 
social good. 
Social added value in the experiment 
According to the above assumptions, social added 
value in this experiment is calculated in two ways: as 
the difference between the arithmetic means of the 
contributions made in a given round and in Round 1 
(option A) and as the difference between the median 
contributions made in a given round and in Round 1 
(option B). Hence there view of findings focuses on 
Rounds 2‒10.  
When analysing the social added value generated 
by all the participants in the experiment (cf. Figure 2), 
of note are quite significant differences in Part Two 
between the two options mentioned above. In option A, 
the variation in the behaviours of individual participants 
in the study is much smaller than in option B. This is 
due to the nature of the arithmetic mean, which tends to 
flatten the results of the analysis. In this case, option B 
of calculating social added value seems to better reflect 
the behaviours of the participants, although on the other 
hand the median takes less account of extreme 
behaviours, which in this case are of certain importance. 
In both options, the highest social added value for 
Part One of the experiment was created in Round 4. 
This proves that a reward is effective, even one that will 
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not necessarily be received, in the process of stimulating 
social value creation. In Part Two, social added value in 
option A followed a sinusoidal course, and in option B, 
a high value at the moment when the composition of 
cities was revealed, was followed by a considerable 
decrease in Round 7, which may be explained by the 
participants’ intention to use the created social capital 
for individual purposes, and then a stable increase until 
the end of the experiment. 
 
Fig. 2. Statistics for Rounds 1‒10 (all three research groups) 
Source: own study. 
 
Fig. 3. Social added value (all research groups) 
Source: own study. 
 
Discussion of findings 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the 
experiment, which may inform research hypotheses in 
future economic experiments. 
In an anonymous society, gamified rewards are a 
more effective than penalties in motivating citizens to 
create social added value. Interestingly, it was not 
certain whether the participants would actually receive 
the rewards in Rounds 4 and 8. Even though the chance 
was only 25%, many users decided to make a higher 
contribution. This is a mechanism applied, among 
others, in receipt lotteries, where participants motivated 
by an attractive reward, but with a very low probability 
of obtaining it, demonstrate behaviours that allow public 
authorities to minimise the grey areas in specific 
industries. 
The disclosure of the city make-up offered a clear 
positive impulse for the creation of social added value, 
which in Part Two of the experiment was clearly higher 
than in its Part One. Despite the fact that the participants 
had the opportunity to apply the strategy of maximising 
individual goals, in a non-anonymous society the vast 
majority of participants decided in favour of 
maximising collective benefits. 
In the experiment, societies characterised by 
higher levels of social capital made higher contributions 
to the public good. Quite possibly, greater trust amongst 
the residents of individual cities resulting from mutual 
Комунальне господарство міст, 2020, том 5, випуск 158   ISSN 2522-1809 (Print); ISSN 2522-1817 (Online) 
8 
acquaintance gave rise to higher social added value. 
Low contributions to the public good in Part One of the 
experiment often resulted in a radical increase in the 
contributions in Part Two. It can therefore be concluded 
that the participants in the experiment in a way 
‘compensated’ for the shortage of social capital in Part 
One in an open society characteristic of Part Two. 
In a situation where at least one of the participants 
adopted a free-rider attitude, the other residents of the 
city usually completely ceased to cooperate, and in 
subsequent rounds, social added value generated in it 
was lower. 
As the experiment unfolded, a relationship 
between the value of the contribution paid and spatial 
cohesion of the cities was observed. As of Round 6, the 
city make-up was revealed to the participants, who 
started to organises pace in the room for themselves in 
order to be as close to their neighbours as possible. As a 
result, the cities developed very different spatial 
arrangements, often depending on the technical 
conditions in the lecture room. In cities characterised by 
less spatial cohesion, rules set by the group were 
violated more often and thus the social added value 
created there was lower. This was also reflected in a 
lower level of trust between the residents. 
Consequently, in the experiment the spatial shape of 
population centres proved to be important for the 
contribution to social added value. This conclusion is in 
line with the criticism of the urban sprawl phenomenon 
(Balaban 2012), which, as was found experimentally, is 
not conducive to building social capital and thus to 
creating social added value. 
Study limitations and indications for 
further research 
In the experiment, social added value resulted 
from an important assumption based on a specific 
mechanism of value creation, namely that the 
contributions to the social good benefited all the 
residents of a given city, whereas the funds retained by 
individuals generated no profit. Such an assumption was 
intended to draw the participants’ attention to the 
societal dimension of such value and focus their actions 
on the dilemma between cooperation with other 
residents and individual actions. The first strategy 
brought the most substantial benefits to the public at 
large, whereas the other one was decidedly 
individualistic. Therefore, the participants worked under 
externally set conditions, which should ostensibly 
encourage them to contribute all their available 
resources to the creation of a social good. However, it 
did not happen owing to the concomitant desire to 
maximise individual profits. 
In the experiment, social added value was defined 
in relative terms with reference to the contributions 
made in Round 1. In Round 1, the arithmetic mean for 
the all three research groups varied in a small range 
(PLN 7.9–8.7), which suggests that according to 
Bernoulli’s law of large numbers
3
(Senet 2013), the 
value of about PLN 8 may be a universal starting point 
for determining social added value in subsequent 
rounds. 
The participants in the experiment sometimes 
treated it as a game and, hence, were tempted to take 
greater risks that they would do in reality. The same 
tendency is observed in testing the so-called willingness 
to pay and willingness to accept –the valuation of non-
market goods tends to be based on respondents’ 
declarations rather than on their actual behaviours. A 
deeper insight into the experiment could be gained from 
a broader consideration of risk-aversion index issues 
(Zhou and Hey 2018).  
At group level, individual contributions to the 
social good may have been influenced by various 
factors remaining outside the overt assumptions adopted 
for the experiment, especially in its Part Two. At that 
stage, the relations established with the other residents 
of the city had a great impact on the decisions. Time and 
again, the actions of certain participants aimed at 
achieving individual profit provoked retaliatory 
responses on the part of their fellow city residents. In 
some cities, dominating personalities were able to 
impose specific decisions on the other residents. Not all 
participants in the experiment realised that the optimal 
strategy from the point of view of the whole city would 
be to make the maximum allowed contributions to the 
creation of a social good. 
Further research in the field of measuring social 
added value via experimental economics should ideally 
involve a study based on a four-group design (Solomon 
1949) with at least two experimental groups and at least 
two control groups. Further to the analysis presented 
above, it is worth exploring in more detail the issue of 
the impact of rewards on participants in the process of 
creating social added value on the range of benefits, 
both in economic and social terms. Social capital’s 
impact on social added value is also worth exploring 
using the methods mentioned above. Finally, a 
promising research venue may also involve 
investigating the effects of stress on decision making 
under experimental conditions (Buser et al. 2017). 
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ВИКОРИСТАННЯ ІНСТРУМЕНТІВ ЕКСПЕРИМЕНТАЛЬНОЇ ЕКОНОМІКИ ДЛЯ 
ВИМІРЮВАННЯ СОЦІАЛЬНОЇ ДОДАНОЇ ВАРТОСТІ: ТЕМАТИЧНЕ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ 
Якуб Гловацкі, Лукащ Маміца 
Краківський економічний університет, Польща  
 
Експериментальна економіка - це інструмент дослідження, при використанні якого інформація, зібрана 
шляхом проведення експериментів, використовується для перевірки обґрунтованості економічних теорій, 
оцінки розміру досліджуваного ефекту або виявлення ринкового механізму. Економічні експерименти зазвичай 
використовують гроші (віртуальні чи реальні), щоб мотивувати учасників і наслідувати реальні стимули, які 
виникають в реальних ринкових умовах. Експерименти використовуються для розуміння того, як і чому ринки 
та інші системи обміну діють/реагують в певний спосіб. Метою цієї статті є використання досягнень 
експериментальної економіки для оцінки суспільної доданої вартості, яка виникає в процесі виробництва та 
постачання суспільних благ, та перевірки ефективності інструментів публічної  політики, які можуть 
стимулювати таку суспільну додану вартість. Стаття складається з (1) концептуальної та методичної 
частини, в якій представлено особливості  та умови проведення експерименту, (2) опису вибірки дослідження 
та (3) аналізу результатів експерименту разом із запропонованими висновками та гіпотезами для подальших 
досліджень з проблематики, які присвячено статтю.  
В ході дослідження соціальна додана вартість стала результатом важливого припущення, заснованого 
на конкретному механізмі створення вартості, а саме: внесок у соціальне благо приносить користь усім 
жителям даного міста, тоді як видатки здійснені конкретними особами не приносять їм прибутку. Таке 
припущення мало на меті привернути увагу учасників до суспільного виміру такої цінності та зосередити свої 
дії на дилемі між співпрацею з іншими мешканцями та індивідуальними діями. Перша стратегія принесла 
найбільшу користь для широкої громадськості, тоді як друга була чітко індивідуальною. Тому учасники 
працювали за умов встановлених зовнішньо, що як передбачалось повинно заохочувати їх використати всі 
наявні ресурси для створення соціального блага. Однак цього не сталося через супутнє прагнення 
максимізувати індивідуальний прибуток.  
Результати даного дослідження можуть бути використані у практичній діяльності, зокрема, під час 
процесу програмування публічними органами влади інструментів, що сприяють реалізації обраної публічної 
політики. 
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